The US–China trade truce gets product lists — and another deadline
Each side has identified about $30 billion of the other's goods for lower tariffs, while China has extended two investigations into US trade practices.
A week after Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington, the US–China trade truce has more paperwork behind it — but not a settlement of the wider economic rivalry.
What the new lists actually do
The two governments have approved product lists worth roughly $30 billion in 2024 trade on each side. The framework says the listed goods will be considered for reduced tariff treatment under each country's domestic legal process.1
US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer described the American side as roughly $30 billion of "non-sensitive goods" and said it represented about 30% of US exports to China.2
The lists do not themselves set the final tariff rates or the date on which reductions begin. Associated Press reported that major strategic sectors such as semiconductors, electric vehicles and batteries are outside the arrangement.3
That makes this a deliberately narrow deal: lower barriers on selected trade while the most politically sensitive industries stay elsewhere.
A permanent committee for a temporary truce
The Board of Trade agreed earlier this year now has formal working procedures. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Greer lead for the United States; Vice Premier He Lifeng leads for China. Deputies are expected to meet at least quarterly.4
The latest truce is due to expire on 10 January 2027. The board gives the two sides a mechanism for talking after individual summit meetings end, but it does not remove the deadline.
China extends two investigations
On 30 September China's Ministry of Commerce extended two trade-barrier investigations into US practices until 27 December.5
The investigations, launched in March, concern measures China says disrupt global supply chains and hinder trade in green products. They were responses to US investigations into Chinese industrial practices.5
Their continuation is a useful measure of the relationship: a tariff-reduction framework can advance at the same time as both governments build cases against each other's trade policies.
The truce is becoming more institutionalised without becoming comprehensive. Regular meetings and agreed lists reduce some uncertainty, but the technologies and industrial policies driving the rivalry remain largely outside the deal.
What remains unresolved
The final tariff rates and implementation dates are still to come. The strategic sectors are outside the lists, China's investigations remain active and the truce expires in January.
The two governments have built a better process for managing the dispute. They have not removed the dispute itself.